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Abstract. An indistiguishability obfuscator is a probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm that takes a circuit as input and outputs a new circuit
that has the same functionality as the input circuit, such that for any
two circuits of the same size that compute the same function, the out-
puts of the indistinguishability obfuscator are computationally indistin-
guishable. Here, we study schemes for indistinguishability obfuscation
for quantum circuits (qiO), which consists in a procedure that takes as
input a quantum circuit and outputs a quantum state, together with
a quantum circuit, which together can be used to evaluate the original
quantum circuit on any quantum input; the security guarantee being
that for two quantum circuits of the same size that have the same input-
output behaviour, the outputs of the obfuscator are computationally in-
distinguishable. Our main result provides a construction for qiO, where
the size of the output of the obfuscator is exponential in the number of
non-Clifford (T gates), which means that the construction is efficient as
long as the number of T gates is logarithmic in the circuit size.
1 Introduction
At the intuitive level, an obfuscator is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
that transforms a circuit C into another circuit C′ that has the same functionality
as C but does not reveal anything about C, except its functionality i.e., anything
that can be learned from C′ about C can also be learned from black-box access
to the input-output functionality of C. This concept is formalized in terms of
virtual black-box obfuscation, and was shown [10] to be unachievable in general.
Motivated by this impossibility result, the same work proposed a weaker notion
called indistinguishability obfuscation (iO).
An indistinguishability obfuscator is a probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithm that takes a circuit C as input and outputs a circuit iO(C) such that
iO(C)(x) = C(x) for all inputs x and the size of iO(C) is at most polynomial
in the size of C. Moreover, it must be that for any two circuits C1 and C2 of
the same size and that compute the same function, their obfuscations are com-
putationally indistinguishable. It is known that iO achieves the notion of best
possible obfuscation, which states that any information that is not hidden by the
obfuscated circuit is also not hidden by any circuit of similar size computing the
same functionality [26]. Indistinguishability obfuscation is a very powerful cryp-
tographic tool which is known to enable, among others: digital signatures, public
key encryption [34], multiparty key agreement, broadcast encryption [13], fully
homomorphic encryption [17] and witness-indistinguishable proofs [12]. Notable
in the context of these applications is the punctured programming technique [34]
which manages to render an iO(C) into an intriguing cryptographic building
block, and this, despite that fact that the security guarantees of iO(C) appear
quite weak as they are applicable only if the two original circuits have exactly
the same functionality.
The first candidate construction of iO was published in [23], with security
relying on the presumed hardness of multilinear maps [19,24,31]. Unfortunately,
there have been many quantum attacks on multilinear maps [5,18,20]. Recently,
a new iO scheme was proposed under different assumptions [9]. Whether or not
this scheme is resistant against quantum attacks remains to be determined.
Indistinguishability obfuscation has been studied for quantum circuits in [3,
4]. In a nutshell (see Section 1.3 for more details), [4] shows a type of obfuscation
for quantum circuits, but without a security reduction. On the other hand, the
focus of [3] is on impossibility of obfuscation for quantum circuits in a variety
of scenarios. Thus, despite these works, until now, the achievability of indistin-
guishability obfuscation for quantum circuits has remained wide open.
1.1 Overview of Results and Techniques
Our contribution establishes indistinguishability obfuscation for certain families
of quantum circuits. We now overview our results and techniques.
First, we define indistinguishability obfuscation for quantum circuits (qiO)
(Section 3). Importantly, this definition specifies that on input a classical de-
scription of a quantum circuit Cq, the obfuscator outputs a pair (|φ〉, C′q), where
|φ〉 is an auxiliary quantum state and C′q is a quantum circuit, with the property
that C′q(|φ〉, |ψ〉) = Cq(|ψ〉) for all inputs |ψ〉. As a straightforward extension of
the classical results, we then argue that inefficient indistinguishability obfusca-
tion exists.
In terms of constructing qiO, we first focus on the family of Clifford cir-
cuits and show two methods of obfuscation: one straightforward method based
on the canonical representation of Cliffords, and another based on the principle
of gate-teleportation [28]. Clifford circuits are quantum circuits that are built
from the gate-set {X,Z,P,CNOT,H}. They are known not to be universal for
quantum computation and are, in a certain sense, the quantum equivalent of
classical linear circuits. It is known that Clifford circuits can be efficiently sim-
ulated on a classical computer [27]; however, note that this simulation is with
respect to a classical distribution, hence for a purely quantum computation,
quantum circuits are required, which motivates the obfuscation of this circuit
class. Furthermore, Clifford circuits are an important building block for fault-
tolerant quantum computing, for instance, due to the fact that Cliffords admit
transversal computations in many fault-tolerant codes.
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Obfuscating Cliffords using a canonical form. Our first construction of qiO for
Clifford circuits starts with the well-known fact that a canonical form is an iO.
We point out that a canonical form for Clifford circuits was presented in [2];
this completes this construction (we also note that an alternative canonical form
was also presented in [35]). This canonical form technique does not require any
computational assumptions. Moreover, the obfuscated circuits are classical, and
hence can be easily communicated, stored, used and copied.
Obfuscating Cliffords using gate-teleportation. Our second construction of qiO
for Clifford circuits takes a very different approach. We start with the gate-
teleportation scheme [28]: according to this, it is possible to encode a quantum
computation Cq into a quantum state (specifically, by preparing a collection of
entangled qubit pairs, and applying Cq to half of this preparation). Then, in order
to perform a quantum computation on a target input |ψ〉, we teleport |ψ〉 into
the prepared entangled state. This causes the state |ψ〉 to undergo the evolution
of Cq, up to some corrections, based on the teleportation bits. If Cq is chosen from
the Clifford circuits, these corrections are relatively simple1 and thus we can use
a classical iO to provide the correction function (note that our construction does
not require a full iO but rather relies on a weaker iO that can obfuscate a certain
family of functions.) In contrast to the previous scheme, the gate-teleportation
scheme requires the assumption of quantum-secure classical iO for a certain
family of functions (Section 2.10) and the obfuscated circuits include a quantum
system. While this presents a technological challenge to communication, storage
and also usage, there could be advantages to storing quantum programs into
quantum states, for instance to take advantage of their uncloneability [1, 16].
Obfuscating Beyond Cliffords. Next, in our main result (Section 5), we general-
ize the gate-teleportation scheme for Clifford circuits, and show a qiO obfuscator
for all quantum circuits where the number of non-Clifford gates is at most loga-
rithmic in the circuit size. For this, we consider the commonly-used Clifford+T
gate-set2, and we note that the T relates to the X,Z as: TXbZa = XbZa⊕bPbT.
This means that, if we implement a circuit C with T gates as in the gate-
teleportation scheme above, then the correction function is no longer a simple
Pauli update (as in the case for Cliffords). However, this is only partially true:
since the Paulis form a basis, there is always a way to represent an update as a
complex, linear combination of Pauli matrices. In particular, for the case of a T,
we note that P = (1+i2 )I + (
1−i
2 )Z. Hence, it is possible to produce an update
function for general quantum circuits that are encoded via gate-teleportation.
To illustrate this, we first analyze the case of a general Clifford+T quantum
circuit on a single qubit (Section 5.1). Here, we are able to provide qiO for all
circuits. Next, for general quantum circuits, (Section 5.2), we note that the up-
date function exists for all circuits, but becomes more and more complex as the
1 The correction is a tensor products of Pauli operators, which is computed as a
function of Cq and of the teleportation bits.
2 The term T-count thus refers to the number of T-gates in a given circuit.
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number of T gates increases. We show that if we limit the number of T gates to
be logarithmic in the circuit size, we can reach an efficient construction. Both
of these constructions assume a quantum-secure, classical indistinguishability
obfuscation.
To the best of our knowledge, our gate-teleportation provides the first method
for indistinguishability obfuscation that is efficient for a large class of quantum
circuits, beyond Clifford circuits. Note, however that canonical forms (also called
normal forms) are known for single-qubits universal quantum circuits [25, 32].
We note that, for many other quantum cryptographic primitives, it is the
case that the T-gate is the bottleneck (somewhat akin to a multiplication in
the classical case). This has been observed, e.g., in the context of homomorphic
quantum encryption [15, 22], and instantaneous quantum computation [37]. Be-
cause of these applications, and since the T is also typically also the bottleneck
for fault-tolerant quantum computing, techniques exist to reduce the T-count in
quantum circuits [7, 8, 21].
1.2 Applications
As mentioned above, indistinguishability obfuscation is known to enable a host of
applications in the classical world. In contrast, relatively little is known about the
applications of quantum indistinguishability obfuscation. We note that [3] shows
that the existence of a computational quantum indistinguishability obfuscation
implies a witness encryption scheme for all languages in QMA. While we expect
that many of the uses of classical iO carry over to the quantum case, we leave
as future work the formal study of these techniques.
1.3 More on Related Work
Quantum Obfuscation. Quantum obfuscation was first studied in [4], where a
notion called (G,Γ )-indistinguishability obfuscation was proposed, where G is a
set of gates and Γ is a set of relations satisfied by the elements of G. In this
notion, any two circuits over the set of gates G are perfectly indistinguishable if
they differ by some sequence of applications of the relations in Γ. Since perfect
indistinguishability obfuscation is known to be impossible under the assumption
that P 6= NP [26], one of the motivations of this work was to provide a weaker def-
inition of perfectly indistinguishable obfuscation, along with possibility results.
However, to the best of our knowledge, (G,Γ )-indistinguishability obfuscation is
incomparable with computational indistinguishability obfuscation [10,23], which
is the topic of our work.
Quantum obfuscation is studied in [3], where the various notions of quan-
tum obfuscation are defined (including quantum black-box obfuscation, quan-
tum indistinguishability obfuscation, and quantum best-possible obfuscation).
A contribution of [3] is to extend the classical impossibility results to the quan-
tum setting, including e.g. showing that each of the three variants of quantum
indistinguishability obfuscation is equivalent to the analogous variant of quan-
tum best-possible obfuscation, so long as the obfuscator is efficient. For the case
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of indistinguishability obfuscation, it is shown that efficient statistical indistin-
guishability obfuscation is impossible unless PSPACE is contained in QSZK3 (for
the case of circuits that include measurements), or unless coQMA4 is contained
in QSZK (for the case of unitary circuits). Notable here is that [3] define indis-
tinguishable obfuscation even for circuits that are close in functionality (and not
necessarily identical). It is unclear if their results hold for the more conventional
notion (which we adopt here) that obfuscations are indistinguishable only in the
case that the original circuits are perfectly equivalent. We note that [3] does not
provide any concrete instantiation of obfuscation.
As described above, a major difference in our definition for qiO is that we
require indistinguishability only in the case that the original circuits are func-
tionally identical. This framework is necessary to establish our results. To see
this, note that the basic instantiation of an indistinguishability obfuscator that
outputs the canonical form is no longer valid in the more stringent definition
of [3]5. Since our work builds upon canonical forms, it is unclear if we could
proceed according to the definition in [3]. Also, we rely on quantum-secure clas-
sical indistinguishability obfuscation, which currently is studied and believed to
hold according to the traditional notion of indistinguishability obfuscation for
identical functionalities6. Another difference is that [3] defines the efficiency of
the obfuscator in terms of the number of qubits. We believe that our definition,
which bounds the size of the output of the obfucation by a polynomial in the size
of the input circuit, is more appropriate7 and follows the lines of the classical
definitions. As far as we know, other definitional differences between our work
and [3] are purely a choice of presentation (see also Note 1).
Quantum Homomorphic Encryption. In quantum homomorphic encryption, a
computationally-weak client is able to send a ciphertext to a quantum server,
such that the quantum server can perform a quantum computation on the en-
crypted data, thus producing an encrypted output which the client can decrypt,
thus obtaining the result of the quantum computation.
This primitive was formally defined in [15] (see also [14, 22]), where it was
shown how to do homomorphic quantum computation for quantum circuits of
low T-depth, by assuming quantum-secure classical fully homomorphic encryp-
3 PSPACE is the class of decision problems solvable by a Turing machine in polynomial
space and QSZK is the class of decision problems that admit a quantum statistical
zero-knowledge proof system.
4 coQMA is the complement of QMA, which is the class of decision problems that can
be verified by a one-message quantum interactive proof.
5 If two different circuits are close in functionality but not identical, then we have no
guarantee that their canonical forms are close.
6 In other words, we require at a minimum that the classical iO scheme that uses
post-quantum assumptions only be secure according to our quantum definition; this
is only possible by making the quantum definition match as closely as possible the
classical definition.
7 It would be unreasonable to allow an obfuscator that outputs a circuit on n qubits,
but of depth super-polynomial in n.
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tion. We note that even the simplest scheme in [15] (which allows the homo-
morphic evaluation of any Clifford circuit), requires computational assumptions
in order for the server to update homomorphically the classical portion of the
ciphertext, based on the choice of Clifford. In contrast, here we are able to give
information-theoretic constructions for this class of circuits (essentially, because
the choice of Clifford is chosen by the obfuscator, not by the evaluator). We
thus emphasize that in iO, we want to hide the circuit, whereas in homomor-
phic encryption, we want to hide the plaintext (and allow remote computations
on the ciphertext). Since the evaluator in homomorphic encryption has control
of the circuit, but not of the data, the evaluator knows which types of gates
are applied, and the main obstacle is to perform a correction after a T-gate,
controlled on a classical value that is held only in an encrypted form by the
evaluator. In contrast to this, in iO, we want to hide the inner workings of the
circuit. By using gate-teleportation, we end up in a situation where the evalua-
tor knows some classical values that have affected the quantum computation in
some undesirable way, and then we want to hide the inner workings of how the
evaluator should compensate for these undesirable effects. Thus, the techniques
of quantum homomorphic encryption do not seem directly applicable, although
we leave as an open question if they could be used in some indirect way, perhaps
towards efficient qiO for a larger family of circuits.
1.4 Open Questions
The main open question is efficient quantum indistinguishabiliy obfuscation for
quantum circuits with super-logarithmic number of T-gates.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews
basic notions required in this work. In Section 3, we formally define indistin-
guishability obfuscation for quantum circuits. In Section 4, we provide the con-
struction for Clifford circuits. Finally, in Section 5, we give our main result which
shows quantum indistinguishability obfuscation for quantum circuits, which is
efficient for circuits having at most a logarithmic number of T gates.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Classical Cryptographic Notions
Let N be the set of positive integers. For n ∈ N, we set [n] = {1, · · · , n}. We
denote the set of all binary strings of length n by {0, 1}n. An element s ∈ {0, 1}n
is called a bitstring, and |s| = n denotes its length. Given two bit strings x and
y of equal length, we denote their bitwise XOR by x⊕ y. For a finite set X , the
notation x
$←− X indicates that x is selected uniformly at random from X . For
n ∈ N, the set of all n × n unitary matrices is {U ∈Mn(C) | UU † = I}, where
U † is the complex conjugate transpose of the matrix for U , and where we denote
the set of all n× n matrices over complex numbers by Mn(C).
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A function negl : N → R+ ∪ {0} is negligible if for every positive polyno-
mial p(n), there exists a positive integer n0 such that for all n > n0, negl(n) <
1/p(n). A typical use of negligible functions is to indicate that the probability of
success of some algorithm is too small to be amplified to a constant by a feasible
(i.e., polynomial) number of repetitions.
2.2 Classical Circuits and Algorithms
A deterministic polynomial-time (orPT) algorithm C is defined by a polynomial-
time uniform8 family C = {Cn | n ∈ N} of classical Boolean circuits over some
gate set, with one circuit for each possible input size n ∈ N. For a bitstring x,
we define C(x) := C|x|(x). We say that a function family f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
is PT-computable if there exists a polynomial-time C such that C(x) = f(x)
for all x; it is implicit that m is a function of n which is bounded by some
polynomial, e.g., the same one that bounds the running time of C. Note that in
the literature, circuits that computes functions whose range is {0, 1}m are often
called multi-output Boolean circuits [29], but in this paper we simply called them
Boolean circuits [36].
A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm (or PPT) is again a polynomial-
time uniform family of classical Boolean circuits, one for each possible input
size n. The nth circuit still accepts n bits of input, but now also has an addi-
tional “coins” register of p(n) input wires. Note that uniformity enforces that
the function p is bounded by some polynomial. For a PPT algorithm C, n-bit
input x and p(n)-bit coin string r, we set C(x; r) := Cn(x; r). In contrast with
the PT case, the notation algorithm C(x) will now refer to the random variable
algorithm C(x; r) where r $←− {0, 1}p(n).
2.3 Basic Quantum Notions
Given an n-bit string x, the corresponding n-qubit quantum computational basis
state is denoted |x〉. The 2n-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by n-qubit basis
states is denoted:
Hn := span {|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n} . (1)
We denote by D(Hn) the set of density operators (i.e., valid quantum states)
on Hn. These are linear operators on D(Hn) which are positive-semidefinite and
have trace equal to 1.
The trace distance between two quantum states ρ, σ ∈ D(Hn) is given by:
||ρ− σ||tr := 1
2
Tr
(∣∣∣∣
√
(ρ− σ)†(ρ− σ)
∣∣∣∣
)
,
where |·| denotes the positive square root of the matrix
√
(ρ− σ)†(ρ− σ).
8 Recall that polynomial-time uniformity means that there exists a polynomial-time
Turing machine which, on input n in unary, prints a description of the nth circuit
in the family.
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Let Φ and Ψ be two admissible operators of type (n,m)9. The diamond norm
between two quantum operators is
||Φ− Ψ ||⋄ := max
ρ∈D(H2n)
||(Φ⊗ In)ρ− (Ψ ⊗ In)ρ||tr
2.4 Bell Basis and Measurement
The four states {|β00〉, |β01〉, |β10〉, |β11〉} are called Bell States or EPR pairs and
form an orthonormal basis of H2.
|β00〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) β01 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)
|β10〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) |β11〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)
we define a generalized Bell state as a tensor product of n Bell states
|βs〉 = |βai,bi〉⊗
n
i=1 ,
where s = a1b1, . . . , anbn ∈ {0, 1}2n. The set of generalized Bell States
{|βs〉|s ∈ {0, 1}2n} forms an orthonormal basis of Hn. Given a quantum state
|ψ〉 =
∑
s∈{0,1}2n
αs|βs〉,
a Bell measurement in the (generalized) Bell basis on the state |ψ〉 outputs the
string s with probability |αs|2 and leaves the system in the state |βs〉.
Quantum Gates. We will work with the following set of unitary gates
X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, P =
[
1 0
0 i
]
, H =
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
,
CNOT =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0

 , and T =
[
1 0
0 eiπ/4
]
.
For any single-qubit density operator ρ ∈ D(H1), we can encrypt it via
the quantum one-time pad by sampling uniform bits s and t, and producing
XsZtρZtXs. To an observer that has no knowledge of s and t, this system is
information-theoretically indistinguishable from the state 11/2 (where 11 is the
2 by 2 identity matrix) [6].
9 An operator is admissible if its action on density matrices is linear, trace-preserving,
and completely positive. A operator’s type is (n,m) if it maps n-qubit states to
m-qubit states.
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The set of gates {X,Z,P,CNOT,H} applied to arbitrary wires redundantly
generates the Clifford group. We note the following relations between these gates
(these relations hold up to global phase; in this work, we use the convention that
equal signs for pure states and unitaries hold up to global phase.)
XZ = −ZX, T2 = P, P2 = Z, HXH = Z, TP = PT, PZ = ZP.
Also, for any a, b ∈ {0, 1} we have HXbZa = XaZbH
2.5 Quantum Circuits and Algorithms.
A quantum circuit is an acyclic network of quantum gates connected by wires.
The quantum gates represent quantum operations and wires represent the qubits
on which gates act. In general, a quantum circuit can have n-input qubits and
m-output qubits for any integer n,m ≥ 0. The T-count is the total number of
T-gates in a quantum circuit.
A quantum circuit that computes a unitary matrix is called a reversible
quantum circuit, i.e., it always possible to uniquely recover the input, given the
output. A set of gates is said to be universal if for any integer n ≥ 1, any n-
qubit unitary operator can be approximated to arbitrary accuracy by a quantum
circuit using only gates from that set [30]. It is a well-known fact that Clifford
gates are not universal, but adding any non-Clifford gate, such as T, gives a
universal set of gates [30]10. Generalized quantum circuits (which implement
superoperators) are composed of the unitary gates, together with trace-out and
measurement operations. It is well-known that a generalized quantum circuit
can be implemented by adding auxiliary states to the original system, applying a
unitary operation on the joint system, and then tracing out some subsystem [30].
A family of generalized quantum circuits C = {Cqn | n ∈ N}, one for each
input size n ∈ N, is called polynomial-time uniform if there exists a deterministic
Turing machine M such that: (i) for each n ∈ N, M outputs a description of
Cqn ∈ C on input 1n; and (ii) for each n ∈ N, M runs in poly(n). We define a
quantum polynomial-time algorithm (or QPT) to be a polynomial-time uniform
family of generalized quantum circuits.
2.6 Classical and Quantum Indistinguishability
Here, we define indistinguishability for classical random variables, against a
quantum distinguisher (Definition 2), and also indistinguishability for quantum
states (Definition 3).
Definition 1. (Statistical Distance) Let X and Y be two random variables over
some countable set Ω. The statistical distance between X and Y is
∆(X,Y ) = 12
{∑
ω∈Ω |Pr[X(ω)]− Pr[Y (ω)]|
}
.
10 In this work, we assume circuits are given in the Clifford + T gateset
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Definition 2. (Indistinguishability) Let X = {Xn}n∈N and Y = {Yn}n∈N be
two distribution ensembles indexed by a parameter n. We say
1. X and Y are perfectly indistinguishable if for all n,
∆(Xn, Yn) = 0.
2. X and Y are statistically indistinguishable if there exists a negligible function
negl such that for all sufficiently large n:
∆(Xn, Yn) ≤ negl(n).
3. {Xn}n∈N and {Yn}n∈N are computationally indistinguishable if for any polynomial-
time quantum distinguisher Dq, there exists a negligible function negl such
that: ∣∣∣Pr[Dq(Xn) = 1]− Pr[Dq(Yn) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n).
Definition 3. (Indistinguishability of Quantum States) Let R = {ρn}n∈N and
S = {σn}n∈N be two ensembles of quantum states such that ρn and σn are n-qubit
states. We say
1. R and S are perfectly indistinguishable if for all n,
ρn = σn.
2. R and S are statistically indistinguishable if there exists a negligible function
negl such that for all sufficiently large n:
||ρn − σn||tr ≤ negl(n).
3. R and S are computationally indistinguishable if there exists a negligible
function negl such that for every state ρn ∈ R, σn ∈ S and for all polynomial-
time quantum distinguisher Dq, we have:∣∣∣Pr[Dq(ρn) = 1]− Pr[Dq(σn) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n).
2.7 Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Let C be a family of probabilistic polynomial-time circuits. For n ∈ N, let Cn
be the circuits in C of input length n. We now provide a definition of indistin-
guishability obfuscation (iO) as defined in [26], but where we make a few minor
modifications.11
11 We make a few design choices that are more appropriate for our situation, where
we show the possibility of iO against quantum adversaries: our adversary is a prob-
abilistic polynomial-time quantum algorithm, we dispense with the mention of the
random oracle, and note that our indistinguishability notions are defined to hold for
all inputs.
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Definition 4. (Indistinguishability Obfuscation, iO) A probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm is a quantum-secure indistinguishability obfuscator (iO) for a
class of circuits C, if the following conditions hold:
1. Preserving Functionality: For any C ∈ Cn :
iO(x) = C(x), for all x ∈ {0, 1}n
The probability is taken over the iO’s coins.
2. Polynomial Slowdown: There exists a polynomial p(n) such that for all in-
put lengths, for any C ∈ Cn, the obfuscator iO only enlarges C by a factor
of p(|C|) :
|iO(C)| ≤ p(|C|).
3. Indistinguishability: An iO is said to be a computational/statistical/
perfect indistinguishability obfuscation for the family C, if for all large enough
input lengths, for any circuit C1 ∈ Cn and for any C2 ∈ Cn that computes
the same function as C1 and such that |C1| = |C2|, the distributions iO(C1))
and iO(C2) are (respectively) computationally/statistically/perfectly indis-
tinguishable.
2.8 Quantum Teleportation
Here we provide a high-level description of quantum teleportation; for a more
rigorous treatment see [11]. Suppose Alice has a quantum state |ψ〉 = α|0〉 +
β|1〉12 that she wants to send to Bob who is located far away from Alice. One
way for Alice to send her qubit to Bob is via the quantum teleportation protocol.
For teleportation to work, Alice prepares a 2-qubit Bell state
|β00〉AB = 1√
2
(|00〉AB + |11〉)AB ,
and sends physically one of the qubit to Bob and keeps the other to herself (this
is what subscript AB means). We can now write the 3-qubit system as
|ψ〉 ⊗ |β00〉AB (2)
Alice now performs a joint measurement on |ψ〉 and her part of the EPR pair
in the Bell basis and obtains the output of the measurement (classical bits a, b).
After this step, Bob’s part of EPR pair has been transformed into the state
XbZa|ψ〉.
Alice sends the two classical bits (a, b) to Bob, who performs the correction
unitary ZaXb to the state he possesses and obtains the state |ψ〉.
2.9 Gate Teleportation
One of the main applications of quantum teleportation is in fault-tolerant quan-
tum computation [28]. To construct unitary quantum circuits, we need to have
access to some universal set of quantum gates13. Suppose we want to evaluate a
12 For simplicity we assume that |ψ〉 is single-qubit pure state.
13 {H,T,CNOT} is a universal set of quantum gates [30].
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single-qubit gate on some quantum state |ψ〉. If we directly apply U on |ψ〉 and U
fails, then it may also destroy the state. Quantum teleportation gives a way of
solving this problem. Instead of applying U directly to |ψ〉, we can apply U to
the system B in Equation (2) and then follow the gate teleportation protocol
and obtain U(|ψ〉). If U fails, then the Bell state might be destroyed, but there
is no harm done, since we can create another EPR pair and try again. The gate
teleportation can easily be generalized to evaluate any n-qubit Clifford circuit
(Algorithm 1).
Remark 1. In this section, we only discuss how to evaluate Clifford gates using
gate teleportation. Note that we can evaluate any unitary circuit using gate-
teleportation but the correction unitary becomes more complicated (it is no
longer a tensor product of Paulis). This is discussed in Section 5.
Algorithm 1 Gate Teleportation Protocol.
Input: A n-qubit Clifford Circuit Cq and n-qubit quantum state |ψ〉
1. Prepare a tensor product of n Bell states: |β2n〉 = |β00〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |β00〉.
2. Write the joint system as |ψ〉C |β
2n〉AB .
3. Apply the circuit Cq on the subsystem B.
4. Perform a measurement in the generalized Bell Basis (generalized Bell measure-
ment) on the system CA and obtain a binary string a1b1, . . . , anbn. The remaining
system after the measurement is
Cq
(
X
biZ
ai
)⊗ni=1
|ψ〉. (3)
5. Compute the correction bits using the update function FCq (Section 2.10).
FCq (a1b1, . . . , anbn) = a
′
1b
′
1, . . . , a
′
nb
′
n ∈ {0, 1}
2n. (4)
6. Compute the correction unitary UFCq =
(
Z
a′iX
b′i
)⊗ni=1
7. Apply UFCq to the system (Equation (3)).
UFCq · Cq
(
X
biZ
ai
)⊗ni=1
|ψ〉 =
(
Z
a′iX
b′i
)⊗ni=1
Cq
(
X
biZ
ai
)⊗ni=1
|ψ〉
=
(
Z
a′iX
b′i
)⊗ni=1 (
X
b′iZ
a′i
)⊗ni=1
Cq(|ψ〉)
= Cq(|ψ〉).
(5)
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2.10 Update Functions for Quantum Gates
Let Cq be an n-qubit circuit consisting of a sequence of Clifford gates g1, . . . , g|Cq|.
Then the update function for Cq is a map from {0, 1}2n to {0, 1}2n and is con-
structed by composing the update functions for each gate in Cq
14
FCq = {0, 1}2n −→ {0, 1}2n
FCq = fg|Cq| ◦ · · · ◦ fg2 ◦ fg1
(6)
For each Clifford gate g, the update function fg is defined below. Note how g
relates to the X and Z gates.
X(XbZa)ψ = (XbZa)X|ψ〉 (update function) fX(a, b) = (a, b)
Z(XbZa)Z = (XbZa)Z|ψ〉 (update function) fZ(a, b) = (a, b)
H(XbXa)Z = (XbXa)H|ψ〉 (update function) fH(a, b) = (b, a)
P(XbXa)Z = (XbXa)P|ψ〉 (update function) fP(a, b) = (a, a⊕ b)
CNOT(Xa1Zb1 ⊗ Xa2Zb2)|ψ〉 = (Xb1Za1⊕a2 ⊗ Xb1⊕b2Zb2)CNOT(|ψ〉) (update function)
fCNOT(a1, b1, a2, b2) = (a1 ⊕ a2, b1, a2, b1 ⊕ b2).
3 Definitions
In this section, we provide definitions for equivalent quantum circuits and Quan-
tum Indistinguishability Obfuscation (qiO). At the end of the section, we also
make an observation about the existence of inefficient quantum indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation.
3.1 Equivalent Quantum Circuits
Definition 5. (Equivalent Quantum Circuits): Let Cq0 and Cq1 be two n-qubit
quantum circuits. We say Cq0 and Cq1 are equivalent if for every n-qubit state |ψ〉
Cq1 (|ψ〉) = Cq2 (|ψ〉)
(recall that equivalence is defined up to global phase).
3.2 Indistinguishability Obfuscation for Quantum Circuits
Definition 6. (Quantum Indistinguishability Obfuscation qiO) Let CQ be a
polynomial-time family of reversible quantum circuits. For n ∈ N, let Cqn be the
circuits in CQ of input length n. A polynomial-time quantum algorithm for CQ
is a quantum indistinguishability obfuscator (qiO) if the following conditions
hold:
14 This composition implicitly assumes that when an update function is applied, it acts
non-trivially on the appropropriate bits, as indicated by the original circuit, and as
the identity elsewhere.
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1. Functionality: There exists a negligible function negl(n) such that for
every Cq ∈ Cqn
(|φ〉, C′q)← qiO(Cq) and ||C′q(|φ〉, ·) − Cq(·)||⋄ ≤ negl(n).
Where |φ〉 is an ℓ-qubit state, the circuits Cq and C′q are of type (n, n) and
(m,n) respectively (m = ℓ + n).15
2. Polynomial Slowdown: There exists a polynomial p(n) such that for any
Cq ∈ Cqn ,
– ℓ ≤ p(|Cq|)
– m ≤ p(|Cq|)
– |C′q| ≤ p(|Cq|).
3. Computational/Statistical/Perfect Indistinguishability: For any
two equivalent quantum circuits Cq1 , Cq2 ∈ Cqn , of the same size, the two dis-
tributions qiO(Cq1 ) and qiO(Cq2 ) are (respectively) computationally/statistically/perfectly
indistinguishable.
Remark 2. A subtlety that is specific to the quantum case is that Definition 6
only requires that (|φ〉, C′q) enable a single evaluation of Cq. We could instead
require a k-time functionality, which can be easily achieved by executing the
single-evaluation scheme k times in parallel. This justifies our focus here on the
single-evaluation scheme.
Note 1. As described in Section 1.3, our definition differs from [3] as it requires
security only in the case of equivalent quantum circuits. We also note that in this
work we focus on unitary circuits only.16 Another difference is that the notion
of indistinguishability (computational or statistical) in [3] is more generous than
ours, since it allows a finite number of inputs that violate the indistinguishability
inequality. Since our work focuses on possibility of obfuscations, our choice leads
to the strongest results; equally, since [3] focuses on impossibility, their results
are strongest in their model.
As far as we are aware, further differences in our definition are purely a choice
of style. For instance, we do not include an interpreter as in [3], but instead we
let the obfuscator output a quantum circuit together with a quantum state; we
chose this presentation since it provides a clear separation between the quantum
circuit output by the qiO and the “quantum advice state”.
Inefficient Quantum Indistinguishability Obfuscators Exist. Finally, we
show a simple extension of a result in [10], which shows that if we relax the
requirement that the obfuscator be efficient, then information-theoretic indistin-
guishability obfuscation exists.
Claim. Inefficient indistinguishability obfuscators exist for all circuits.
15 A circuit is of type (i, j) if it maps i qubits to j qubits.
16 This is without loss of generality, since a qiO for a generalized quantum circuit can
be obtained from a qiO for a reversible version of the circuit, followed by a trace-out
operation (see Section 2.5).
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Proof. Let qiO(C)q be the lexicographically first circuit of size |Cq| that com-
putes the same quantum map as Cq. ⊓⊔
4 Quantum Indistinguishability Obfuscation for Clifford
Circuits
Here, we show how to construct qiO for Clifford circuits. The first construction
(Section 4.1) is based on a canonical form, and the second is based on gate-
teleportation (Section 4.2).
4.1 qiO for Clifford Circuits via a Canonical Form
Aaronson and Gottesman developped a polynomial-time algorithm that takes a
Clifford circuit Cq and outputs its canonical form (see [2], section VI), which
is invariant for any two equivalent n-qubit circuits17. Moreover the size of the
canonical form remains polynomial in the size of the input circuit. Based on this
canonical form, we define a qiO in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 qiO-Canonical
– Input: An n-qubit Clifford Circuit Cq.
1. Using the Aaronson and Gottesman algorithm [2], compute the canonical form
of Cq
C′q
canonical form
←−−−−−−−−−−− Cq
2. Let |φ〉 be an empty register.
3. Output
(
|φ〉, C′q
)
.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 2 is a Perfect Quantum Indistinguishability Obfuscation
for all Clifford Circuits.
Proof. We have to show that Algorithm 2 satisfies the definition of a perfect
quantum indistinguishability obfuscation (Definition 6) for all Clifford circuits.
1. Functionality: Since |φ〉 is an empty register, it is a 0 qubit state (ℓ = 0.)
The circuit C′q is the canonical form of Cq, therefore, it is also of type (n, n)
and has the same functionality as Cq. We have ||C′q(|φ〉, ·) − Cq(·)||⋄ = 0 ≤
negl(n) for any negligible function negl(n).
2. Polynomial Slowdown: Note C′q is constructed using Aaronson and Gottes-
man algorithm [2]. Therefore, there exists a polynomial q(·) such that |C′q| ≤
q(|Cq |). Let p(n) = q(n) + n then we clearly have
17 Their algorithm outputs a canonical form (unique form) provided it runs on the
standard initial tableau see pages 8-10 of [2].
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– ℓ ≤ p(|Cq|)
– n ≤ p(|Cq|)
– |C′q| ≤ p(|Cq|).
3. Perfectly Indistinguishability: Let Cq1 , Cq2 ∈ Cqn , be any two equiv-
alent Clifford circuits of the same size. Let
(|φ1〉, C′q1 )← qiO-Canonical(Cq1) and (|φ2〉, C′q2)← qiO-Canonical(Cq2 ).
Since the canonical form of any two equivalent Clifford circuits are exactly
the same, we have Cq′
1
= Cq′
2
. Moreover both |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 are empty regis-
ters we have |φ1〉 = |φ2〉. We have
qiO-Canonical(Cq1) = qiO-Canonical(Cq2).
Therefore, Algorithm 2 is a perfect quantum indistinguishability obfuscation
for all Clifford Circuits. ⊓⊔
4.2 qiO for Clifford Circuits via Gate Teleportation
In this section, we show how gate teleportation (see Algorithm 1) can be used
to construct a quantum indistinguishability obfuscation for Clifford circuits.
Our construction, given in Algorithm 3, relies on the existence of a quantum-
secure iO for classical circuits; however, upon closer inspection, our construction
relies on the assumption that a quantum-secure classical iO exists for a very spe-
cific class of classical circuits18. In fact, it is easy to construct a perfectly secure
iO for this class of circuits: like Clifford circuits, the circuits that compute the
update functions also have a canonical form. Then the iO takes as input a Clif-
ford circuit and outputs a canonical form of a classical circuit that computes the
update function for Cq. The iO is described formally in Algorithm 4.
18 Circuits that compute update functions for Clifford circuits, see Section 2.10.
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Algorithm 3 qiO via Gate Teleportation for Clifford
– Input: An n-qubit Clifford Circuit Cq.
1. Prepare a tensor product of n Bell states: |β2n〉 = |β00〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |β00〉.
2. Apply the circuit Cq on the right-most n qubits to obtain a system |φ〉:
|φ〉 = (In ⊗ Cq)|β
2n〉.
3. Compute a classical circuit C that computes the update function FCq . The
classical circuit C can be computed in polynomial-time by Lemma 3.
4. Set C′ ← iO(C), where iO(C) is a perfectly secure indistinguishability obfus-
cation defined in Section 4.2.
5. Description of the circuit C′q :
(a) Perform a general Bell measurement on the leftmost 2n-qubits on the
system |φ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉, where |φ〉 is an auxiliary state and |ψ〉 is an input state.
Obtain classical bits (a1, b1 . . . , an, bn) and the state
Cq(X
⊗
n
i=1bi · Z⊗
n
i=1ai)|ψ〉. (7)
(b) Compute the correction bits
(a′1, b
′
1, . . . , a
′
n, b
′
n) = C
′(a1, b1 . . . , an, bn). (8)
(c) Using the above, the correction unitary is U ′ = (X⊗
n
i=1b
′
i · Z⊗
n
i=1a
′
i).
(d) Apply U ′ to the system Cq(X
⊗
n
i=1bi · Z⊗
n
i=1ai)|ψ〉 to obtain the state
Cq(|ψ〉).
6. Output
(
|φ〉, C′q
)
.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 3 is a perfect quantum indistinguishability obfuscation
for all Clifford Circuits.
Proof. We have to show that Algorithm 3 satisfies Definition 6.
1. Functionality: Let Cq be an n-qubit Clifford Circuit and
(|φ〉, C′q) be the
output of the Algorithm 3 on input Cq. On input (In⊗Cq)|β2n〉 and |ψ〉 the
circuit C′q outputs the state Cq(|ψ〉) (this follows from the principle of gate-
teleportation). Therefore C′q(|φ〉, ·) = Cq(ψ), which implies that ||C′q(|φ〉, ·)−
Cq(·)||⋄ = 0 ≤ negl(n) for any negligible function negl(n).
2. Polynomial Slowdown: Note ℓ = 2n (the number of qubits in |φ〉) and
C′q is a circuit of type (3n, n). The size of the circuit |C′q| = |iO(C)| +
|Bell measurement|, where C is the classical circuit that computes the update
function corresponding to Cq. The size of a Bell measurement circuit for an
O(n)-qubit state is O(n). Therefore, there exists a polynomial q(|C|) such
that |Bell measurement| ≤ q(|C|)|. The size of |iO(C)| is at most r(|C|) for
some polynomial r(·) (Lemma 3). Further, the size of |C| is at most s(|Cq |)
for some polynomial |Cq| (Lemma 3). By setting p(|C|) = 2|Cq| + q(|C|) +
r(s(|C|)), we have
– ℓ ≤ p(|C|)
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– m = 3n ≤ p(|C|)
– |C′q| = |iO(C)| + |Bell measurement| ≤ p(|C|).
3. Perfect Indistinguishability: Let Cq1 and Cq2 be two n-qubit equiva-
lent Clifford circuits of the same size. Let
(|φ1〉, C′q1) and (|φ2〉, C′q2) be the
outputs of Algorithm 3 on inputs Cq1 and Cq2 respectively. Since Cq1 (|τ〉) =
Cq2(|τ〉) for every quantum state |τ〉 we have,
|φ1〉 = (I ⊗ Cq1)|β2n〉 = (I ⊗ Cq2)|β2n〉 = |φ2〉. (9)
The update functions for any two equivalent Clifford circuits are equivalent
(Lemma 2), further the classical iO that obfuscates the update functions
(circuits) is perfectly indistinguishable for any two equivalent Clifford circuits
(not necessarily of the same size) (Lemma 3). Therefore, C′q1 and C
′
q2 are
perfectly indistinguishable. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. Let Cq1 and Cq2 be two equivalent n-qubit Clifford circuits. Then
their corresponding update functions are also equivalent.
Proof. Let FCq1 and FCq2 be the update functions for two n-qubit Clifford cir-
cuits Cq1 and Cq2 respectively. Suppose FCq1 6= FCq2 , then there must exist at
least one binary string s = a1b1 . . . anbn ∈ {0, 1}2n such that
FCq1 (s) 6= FCq2 (s) (10)
Since Cq1 and Cq2 are equivalent circuit we must have that for every quantum
state |ψ〉:
Cq1(X
⊗ni=1bi · Z⊗ni=1ai)|ψ〉 = Cq2 (X⊗
n
i=1bi · Z⊗ni=1ai)|ψ〉 (11)
Let FCq1 (s) = (a
′
1b
′
1, . . . a
′
nb
′
n) and FCq2 (s) = (d
′
1e
′
1, . . . , d
′
ne
′
n), then we can
rewrite Equation (11) as
(X⊗
n
i=1b
′
i · Z⊗ni=1a′i)Cq1 (|ψ〉) = (X⊗
n
i=1e
′
i · Z⊗ni=1d′i)Cq2(|ψ〉). (12)
We can replace Cq2 (|ψ〉) with Cq1 (|ψ〉) in Equation (12)
(X⊗
n
i=1b
′
i · Z⊗ni=1a′i)Cq1 (|ψ〉) = (X⊗
n
i=1e
′
i · Z⊗ni=1d′i)Cq1(|ψ〉). (13)
Now if there exists a j such that a′j 6= d′j or b′j 6= e′j , then Equation (13)
does not hold. This contradicts the assumption that Cq1 and Cq2 are equivalent
Clifford circuits. Therefore FCq1 and FCq2 are equivalent functions.
19 ⊓⊔
Indistinguishability Obfuscator for Clifford Update Functions. Here,
we describe a perfect indistinguishability obfuscator iO for the update func-
tions corresponding to the Clifford circuits. The algorithm takes an n-qubit
Clifford circuit Cq and output a classical circuit C that computes the update
function FCq . The circuit C is invariant for any two equivalent Clifford circuits.
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Algorithm 4 iO for Clifford update Functions.
1. Compute the canonical form Cq using the algorithm presented in [2] (section VI).
Denote the canonical form as Ĉq.
2. Let g1, g2, . . . , gm be a topological ordering of the gates in Ĉq, where m = |Ĉq |.
3. Construct the classical circuit Cˆ that computes the update function F
Ĉq
as follows.
For i = 1 to m, implement the update rule for each gate gi (Section 2.10).
4. Output the classical circuit Cˆ.
The main idea here is to compute the canonical form for the Clifford circuit, and
then compute the update function for the canonical form.
Lemma 3. Algorithm 4 is a perfect classical indistinguishability obfuscator for
the Clifford update functions.
Proof. We have to show that Algorithm 4 satisfies Definition 4.
1. Functionality: Let Cq be an n-qubit Clifford circuit and C be the circuit
that computes FCq (the update function for Cq). Let Ĉq be the canonical
form of Cq. Since Cq and Cq
′ are equivalent circuits, it follows from Lemma 2
that FCq and F
′
Cq
are equivalent functions, therefore any circuit that com-
putes F ′Cq also computes FCq . From the construction above (Algorithm 4)
it follows that the circuit Cˆ computes F ′Cq therefore Cˆ(x) = C(x) for all
inputs x.
2. Polynomial Slowdown: For each gate gi in Ĉq, the classical circuit Ĉ has
to implement one of the following operations (Section 2.10):
(a, b)
X,Z−−→ (a, b).
(a, b)
H−→ (b, a) (one swap).
(a, b)
P−→ (a, a⊕ b) (one ⊕ operation).
(a1, b1, a2, b2)
CNOT−−−−−→ (a1 ⊕ a2, b1, a2, b1 ⊕ b2) (two ⊕ operations).
Therefore the size of |Ĉ| can be at most be O(|Ĉq |). The Ĉq is a canonical
form of Cq and of at most q(|Cq|) for some polynomial q(·) [2]. Therefore,
there exists a polynomial p(·) such that |Ĉ| ≤ p(|Cq|).
3. Perfectly Indistinguishability:Let Cq1 , Cq2 be two equivalent n-qubit
Clifford circuits (not necessarily of the same size) and Ĉq be their canonical
form. Note that the output of Algorithm 4 only depends on the canonical
form of the input Clifford circuit. Since, Cq1 and Cq2 have the same canonical
form we have
Cˆ ← Algorithm 4(Ĉq) = Algorithm 4(Cq1) = Algorithm 4(Cq2),
Therefore, Algorithm 4 is a perfect indistinguishability obfuscation for the
Clifford update functions. ⊓⊔
19 The Equation (12) is derived from the assumption that Cq1 and Cq2 are equivalent
Clifford circuits.
Remark 3. What is convenient about the iO of Algorithm 4 is that it works
for any two equivalent Clifford circuits (regardless of their relative sizes) (see
Lemma 2). However, we can use any perfectly secure iO in our construction with
some care. Suppose iO is some perfectly secure indistinguishability obfuscator
for classical circuits (for Clifford update functions) of the same size. Suppose
we want to obfuscate an update circuit corresponding to some Clifford Cq. The
classical circuit C is constructed by going through each gate in Cq. Some gates
are more costly than others (for e.g., CNOT vs. Z, see proof of Theorem 1 or
Section 2.10). Since we assume all Clifford circuits are of the same size, we can
obtain an upper bound on all the classical circuits (for the update functions)
by replacing each gate in Cq with the most costly gate and then computing the
classical circuit for the resulting quantum gate. Now suppose m is the upper
bound on the size of classical circuits, then for any circuit Cq, we first calculate
the circuit C that computes FCq and then pad C with m − |C| identity gates.
This will ensure that if |Cq1 | = |Cq2 |, then |C1| = |C2|.
5 Obfuscating Beyond Clifford Circuits
In this section, we extend the gate teleportation technique to show how we can
construct qiO for any quantum circuit. Our construction is efficient as long as
the circuit has T-count at most logarithmic in the circuit size. For the sake of
simplicity, we first construct a qiO for an arbitrary 1-qubit quantum circuit
(Section 5.1), then extend the 1-qubit construction to any n-qubit quantum cir-
cuit (Section 5.2).
We first start with some general observations on quantum circuits which are
relevant to this section. Consider the application of the T-gate on an encrypted
system using the quantum one-time pad. The following equation relates the T-
gate to the X- and Z-gates:
TXbZa = XbZa⊕bPbT . (14)
If b = 0, then Pb is the identity; otherwise we have a P-gate correction. This is
undesirable as P does not commute with X, making the update of the encryption
key (a, b) complicated (since it is no longer a tensor product of Paulis). Note that
we can write P =
(
1+i
2
)
I+
(
1−i
2
)
Z, therefore Equation (14) can be rewritten as:
TXbZa = XbZa⊕b
[(
1 + i
2
)
I+
(
1− i
2
)
Z
]b
T (15)
Since
[(
1+i
2
)
I+
(
1−i
2
)
Z
]b
=
(
1+i
2
)
I +
(
1−i
2
)
Zb for b ∈ {0, 1}, we can rewrite
Equation (15) as,
TX
b
Z
a = XbZa⊕b
[(
1 + i
2
)
I+
(
1− i
2
)
Z
b
]
T
=
[(
1 + i
2
)
XbZa⊕b +
(
1− i
2
)
XbZa
]
T.
(16)
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It follows from Equation (16) that for any a, b ∈ {0, 1}, we can represent
TXbZa as a linear combination of X and Z.
TX
b
Z
a = (α1I+ α2X+ α3Z+ α4XZ)T (17)
where αj ∈
{
0, 1, 1+i2 ,
1−i
2
}
, for j ∈ [4].
We further note that for a general n-qubit quantum unitary U and n-qubit
Pauli P , there exists a Clifford C such that UP |ψ〉 = CU |ψ〉. This is due to the
Clifford hierarchy [28]. We also mention that if an n-qubit Clifford operation is
given in matrix form, an efficient procedure exists in order to produce a circuit
that executes this Clifford [33]. This is a special case of the general problem of
synthesis of quantum circuits, which aims to produce quantum circuits, based
on an initial description of a unitary operation.
5.1 Single-Qubit Circuits
Here, we show an indistinguishability obfuscation for single-qubit circuits. As
previously mentionned, we note that for the single-qubit case, an efficient in-
distinguishability obfuscation can also be built using the Matsumoto-Amano
normal form [25, 32]. Here, we give an alternate construction based on gate-
teleportation. Let Cq be a 1-qubit circuit we want to obfuscate and |ψ〉 be the
quantum state on which we want to evaluate Cq. Note that we can write any
1-qubit circuit as a sequence of gates from the set {H,T}20
Cq = (g|Cq|, . . . , g2, g1), gi ∈ {H,T} .
For the indistinguishability obfuscation of a single-qubit circuit, we use the gate-
teleportation protocol (Algorithm 1), which leaves us (after the teleportation)
with a subsystem of the form CqX
bZa(|ψ〉)
CqX
bZa(|ψ〉) = (g|Cq|, . . . , g2, g1)XbZa(|ψ〉), (18)
and to evaluate the circuit on |ψ〉, we have to apply a correction unitary. Now
suppose we apply the gate g1. We can write the system in Equation (18) as
CqX
bZa(|ψ〉) = (g|Cq|, . . . , g2)(α0I+ α1X+ α2Z+ α3XZ)g1(|ψ〉) (19)
where αi ∈
{
0, 1, 1+i2 ,
1−i
2
}
. Since {I,X,Z,XZ}, forms a basis, after applying the
remaining gates in the sequence (g|Cq|, . . . , g3, g2), we can write Equation (19)
as
CqX
b
Z
a(|ψ〉) = (β1I+ β2X+ β3Z+ β4XZ)(g|Cq|, . . . , g2, g1)(|ψ〉) (20)
where each βi ∈ C and is computed by multiplying and adding numbers from the
set {0, 1, 1+i2 , 1−i2 }. We show in Appendix A that the size of the coefficients βi
grows at most as a polynomial in the number of T-gates. Therefore it follows
20 The set {H,T} is universal for 1-qubit unitaries [30].
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from Equation (20) that the update function for any 1-qubit circuit Cq can be
defined as the following map,
FCq : {0, 1}2 → C4, (a, b) 7→ (β1, β2, β3, β4),
and is in one-to-one correspondence with the correction unitary β1I + β2X +
β3Z + β4XZ. As indicated, our construction for 1-qubit circuits is nearly the
same as the gate-teleportation scheme for Clifford circuits (Algorithm 3). The
proof that this is a qiO scheme is also very similar to the proof for the Clifford
construction (Section 4.2); we thus omit the formal proof here (it can also be
seen as a special case of the proof of Theorem 2). Some subtleties, however are
addressed below: the equivalence of the update functions (Lemma 4) and the
circuit synthesis (Lemma 5).
Lemma 4. Let Cq1 and Cq2 be two equivalent 1-qubit circuits. Then their corre-
sponding update functions in the gate teleportation protocol are also equivalent.
Proof. Suppose FCq1 (a, b) = (β1, β2, β3, β4, ) and FCq2 (a, b) = (γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4) are
the corresponding update functions for a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Since Cq1 and Cq2 are
equivalent circuits, for every quantum state |ψ〉 and any a, b ∈ {0, 1},
Cq1X
bZa(|ψ〉) = Cq2XbZa(|ψ〉)
⇔ (β1I+ β2X+ β3Z+ β4XZ)Cq1 (|ψ〉) = (γ1I+ γ2X+ γ3Z+ γ4XZ)Cq2 (|ψ〉)
⇔ (β1I+ β2X+ β3Z+ β4XZ)Cq1 (|ψ〉) = (γ1I+ γ2X+ γ3Z+ γ4XZ)Cq1 (|ψ〉)
⇔ ((β1 − γ1)I+ (β2 − γ2)X+ (β3 − γ3)Z+ (β4 − γ4)XZ)Cq1 (|ψ〉) = 0.
⇒ (β1 − γ1)I+ (β2 − γ2)X+ (β3 − γ3)Z+ (β4 − γ4)XZ = 0.
⇒ β1 = γ1, β2 = γ2, β3 = γ3, β4 = γ4.
Therefore, FCq1 and FCq2 are equivalent functions. ⊓⊔
We note that, on top of being equal, the circuits that compute the update
functions FCq1 , FCq2 can be assumed to be of the same size. This follows by an
argument very similar to the one in Remark 3.
Lemma 5. Based on the classical iO that computes the coefficients in Equation (20),
it is possible to build a quantum circuit that performs the correction efficiently.
Proof. Given a 2 × 2 unitary matrix that represents a Clifford operation as in
Equation (20), it is simple to efficiently derive the Clifford circuit that imple-
ments the unitary. This is a special case of the general efficient synthesis for
Clifford circuits as presented in [33]. ⊓⊔
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Algorithm 5 qiO via Gate Teleportation for Quantum Circuits
– Input: A n-qubit quantum Circuit Cq with T-count ∈ O(log(|Cq |)).
1. Prepare a tensor product of n Bell states: |β2n〉 = |β00〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |β00〉.
2. Apply the circuit Cq on the right-most n qubits to obtain a system |φ〉:
|φ〉 = (In ⊗ Cq)|β
2n〉.
3. Set Cˆ ← iO(C). Where C is a circuit that computes the update function FCq
as in Section 5.4. Note the size of C is at most a polynomial in |Cq | (Lemma 8).
4. Description of the circuit C′q :
(a) Perform a general Bell measurement on the leftmost 2n-qubits on the
system |φ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉, where |φ〉 is an auxiliary state and |ψ〉 is an input state.
Obtain classical bits (a1, b1 . . . , an, bn) and the state
Cq(X
⊗
n
i=1bi · Z⊗
n
i=1ai)|ψ〉.
(b) Compute the correction using the obfuscated circuit
((β1, s1), . . . , (βn, sk)) = Cˆ(a1, b1 . . . , an, bn).
(c) Using the above, the correction unitary is
UFCq =
4
k∑
i=1
βiX
bi1Z
ai1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XbinZain .
Compute a quantum circuit that applies UFCq , using the circuit synthesis
method of [33].
(d) Apply the quantum circuit for UFCq to the system Cq(X
⊗
n
i=1bi ·Z⊗
n
i=1ai)|ψ〉
to obtain the state Cq(|ψ〉).
5.2 qiO via Gate Teleportation for all Quantum Circuits
In this section, we construct a qiO for all quantum circuits. The construction
is efficient whenever the number of T-gates is at most logarithmic in the circuit
size (see Algorithm 5). The reason for this limitation is that the update function
blows up once the number of T-gates is greater than logarithmic in the circuit
size. The construction is very similar to the gate teleportation for Clifford circuits
(Section 4.2) and assumes the existence of a quantum-secure iO for classical
circuits.
We are now ready to present our main theorem (Theorem 2). For ease of
presentation, the proof relies on three auxiliary lemmas that are presented in the
following section: Lemma 6 (which shows that equivalent circuits have equivalent
update functions), Lemma 7 (which bounds the number of terms of the update
function), and Lemma 8 (which shows that update functions can be computed
by a polynomial-size circuits).
Theorem 2. (Main Theorem) If iO is a perfect/statistical/computational quantum-
secure indistinguishability obfuscation for classical circuits, then Algorithm 5 is a
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perfect/statistical/computational quantum indistinguishability obfuscator for any
quantum circuit Cq with T-count ∈ O(log |Cq|).
Proof. We have to show that Algorithm 5 satisfies Definition 6. Throughout the
proof, we assume that the quantum circuits have a logarithmic T-count in the
circuit size.
1. Functionality: The proof of functionality follows from the principle of
gate-teleportation and is very similar to the proof in Theorem 1. Since the
Clifford circuit synthesis has perfect correctness [33], we have ||C′q(|φ〉, ·) −
Cq(·)||⋄ = 0 ≤ negl(n) for any negligible function negl(n).
2. Polynomial Slowdown: Note that |φ〉 is a 2n-qubit state and C′q is of type
(m,n), where m = 3n, therefore both |φ〉 and m have size in O(|Cq |). The
size of C′q is equal to the size of Cˆ plus the size of the circuit that performs the
general Bell measurement (GBM) and the size of the circuit that computes
the circuit for UFCq . Since the size of |GBM | is in O(n), the size of |Cˆ| is
polynomial in |Cq| (Lemma 7, Lemma 8, Lemma 9 and the definition of iO).
Moreover, efficient Clifford synthesis implies that the size of the circuit for
UFCq is polynomial [33]. Therefore, there exists a polynomial p(·) such that
– ||φ〉| ≤ p(|Cq|)
– m ≤ p(|Cq|)
– |C′q| ≤ p(|Cq|).
3. Perfect/Statistical/Computational Indistinguishability:Let Cq1 and
Cq2 be two n-qubit circuits of the same size. Let
(|φ1〉, C′q1) and (|φ2〉, C′q2)
be the outputs of Algorithm 3 on inputs Cq1 and Cq2 respectively. Since
Cq1(|τ〉) = Cq2(|τ〉) for every quantum state |τ〉 we have,
|φ1〉 = (I ⊗ Cq1)|β2n〉 = (I ⊗ Cq2)|β2n〉 = |φ2〉, (21)
The update functions for any two equivalent quantum circuits are equivalent
(Lemma 6). If the classical iO that obfuscates the circuits for the update
functions is perfectly/statistically/computationally indistinguishable, then
states C′q1 and C
′
q2 are perfectly/statistically/computationally indistinguish-
able.21 Therefore, Algorithm 5 is a perfectly/statistically/ computationally
indistinguishable quantum obfuscator for the quantum circuits. ⊓⊔
5.3 Equivalent Update Functions
Here, we provide a generalization of Lemma 2, applicable to the case of general
circuits.
Lemma 6. Let Cq1 and Cq2 be two equivalent n-qubit circuits. Then their cor-
responding update functions are also equivalent.
21 Note that circuits that compute update functions (for equivalent quantum circuits)
may have different sizes. However, that can be managed as discussed in Remark 3.
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Proof. Suppose Cq1 and Cq2 are two equivalent n-qubit quantum circuits, then
for any quantum state |ψ〉 and for any binary string r ∈ {0, 1}2n.
Cq1 (X
aiZbi)⊗
n
i=1 |ψ〉 = Cq2(XaiZbi)⊗
n
i=1 |ψ〉. (22)
Then the corresponding update functions are (see Equation (26))
FCq1 (r) = ((β1, s1), . . . , (βn, sk))
FCq1 (r) = ((β
′
1, s
′
1), . . . , (β
′
ℓ, s
′
ℓ))
where si = ai1bi1 , . . . , ainbin ∈ {0, 1}2n, and s′j = aj1bj1 , . . . , ajnbjn ∈ {0, 1}2n.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that βi 6= 0, β′j 6= 0 for i ∈ [k], j ∈ [ℓ].
Using the update functions, we can rewrite Equation (22) as

 4k∑
i=1
βiX
bi1Z
ai1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XbinZain

Cq1 |ψ〉 =

 4ℓ∑
j=1
β′jX
b′j1Z
a′j1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xb′jn

Cq2 |ψ〉.
(23)
Since Cq1 and Cq2 are equivalent, we can replace Cq2 with Cq1 in Equation (23)

 4k∑
i=1
βiX
bi1Zai1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XbinZain

Cq1 |ψ〉 =

 4ℓ∑
j=1
β′jX
b′j1Z
a′j1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xb′jn

Cq1 |ψ〉
(24)
Then Equation (24) can only hold if

 4k∑
i=1
βiX
bi1Zai1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XbinZain

 =

 4ℓ∑
j=1
β′jX
b′j1Z
a′j1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xb′jn

 (25)
Note the update functions FCq1 and FCq2 are in one-to-one mapping with the
unitaries on the left- and right-hand side of Equation (25) respectively. Since, the
unitaries are equivalent, the corresponding update functions are also equivalent.
⊓⊔
5.4 Complexity of Computing the Update Function
Let Cq be an n-qubit circuit consisting of a sequence of gates g1 . . . , g|Cq|. The
update function FCq is computed by composing update functions for each gate
in Cq.
FCq = fg|Cq | ◦ · · · ◦ fg2 ◦ fg1 .
Therefore the update function for any n-qubit quantum circuit Cq with k T-gates
can be defined as the following map.
FCq : {0, 1}2n −→ (C× {0, 1}2n)min(k,n),
(a1, b1, . . . , an, bn) 7→ ((β1, s1), . . . , (β4k , s4k)) .
(26)
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which corresponds to the following correction unitary
4k∑
i=1
βiX
bi1Z
ai1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XbinZain . (27)
where βi ∈ C and si = ai1bi1 , . . . , ainbin ∈ {0, 1}2n, i ∈ [4k]. Therefore, in or-
der to satisfy the efficiency requirement (polynomial-slowdown), we must have
k ∈ O(log(|Cq|)). Note that the range of the update function can increase ex-
ponentially in the number of T-gates as long as k ≤ n (Equation (26)). This
is because there are at most 22n binary strings of length 2n, therefore for any
n-qubit circuit, the correction unitary Equation (27) can be written as a sum-
mation of at most 22n terms. We will first prove that as long as the T-count in
O(log(|Cq |), the number of terms in FCq has at most O(|Cq |) terms.
Lemma 7. If Cq is an n-qubit quantum circuit with T-count in O(log(|Cq |),
then the update function FCq (Equation (26)) has at most O(|Cq |) terms.
Proof. Let Cq be an n-qubit circuit with T-count in O(log(|Cq|). Suppose we
want to evaluate Cq on some n-qubit state |ψ〉, then after the step 4a of Algorithm 5,
we will obtain a state
Cq(X
a1Zb1 ⊗ Xa2Zb2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XanZbn)|ψ〉. (28)
In order to recover Cq(|ψ〉) from the above expression, we multiply the correction
unitary UFCq to the left hand side of expression Equation (28). To compute UFCq
we first compute the update function FCq on the input a1b1, . . . , anbn
FCq (a1b1, . . . , anbn) = ((β1, s1), . . . , (β4k , s4k))
where βi ∈ C, si ∈ {0, 1}2n, k ∈ N
UFCq =
4k∑
i=1
βiX
bi1Zai1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XbinZain .
We will show that if the T-count is in O(log(|Cq|), then k ∈ O(|Cq |) (number
of terms). Recall that
TXbZa = (α1I+ α2X+ α3Z+ α4XZ)T (29)
– Case 0: Suppose Cq has no T-gates, then Cq is a Clifford and there is only
one term in FCq . Therefore k = 0.
– Case 1: Suppose Cq has one T-gate (acting on some ℓ-th wire).
Cq(X
a1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XanZbn)
= (X⊗
ℓ−1
i=1
b′iZ⊗
ℓ−1
i=1
a′i)⊗

 4∑
j=1
βjX
b′jZa
′
j

⊗ (X⊗ni=ℓ+1b′iZ⊗ni=ℓ+1a′i)Cq
=
4∑
i=1
βiX
b′i1Z
a′i1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xb′inZa′in .
(30)
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Therefore k ≤ 4. It is important to realize that 4 is the maximum number
of terms a circuit with T can have. No Clifford gate including CNOT can
increase the number of terms beyond 4. This is because only a T gate can
contribute a 4-term expression and then we expand all the terms in the
correction unitary to maximum (Equation (30)). Now any Clifford acting on
the correction unitary will act linearly on UFCq and only affect the bits a
′
i
and b′i (Equation (30)).
– Case 2: Similarly, if Cq has two T gates, then each will contribute at most
one expression of the form (β1I + β2X + β3Z + β4XZ). This will give us a
correction unitary UFCq =
∑42
i=1 βiX
bi1Zai1⊗· · ·⊗XbinZain , therefore k ≤ 16.
Note that it makes no difference whether T gates are acting on the same wire
or on different wires for the worst-case analysis. If they are on the same wire,
then the first T will contribute 4 terms and the second T will expand each
term into 4 more terms, resulting in 16 terms. If they are acting on different
wires, say i and j and suppose CNOTs are acting on the i-th to j-th wire,
then we may have to expand all terms in the unitary to apply CNOTs. This
again can contribute at most 16 terms.
General Case: Suppose Cq has O(log(|Cq |) T gates, then each T-gate will
contribute at most a linear combination of 4 terms and in total at most
4O(log(|Cq|) terms. therefore k ∈ O(|Cq |). ⊓⊔
Lemma 8. If Cq be an n-qubit quantum circuit with T-count ∈ O(log |Cq|), then
there exists a classical circuit C and a polynomial p(·) such that
– C computes the update function FCq ,
– |C| ≤ p(|Cq|).
Proof. Let Cq be a n-qubit quantum circuit with T-count ∈ O(log |Cq|). Recall
from Section 2.10 that the corresponding update functions for the Clifford + T
gate set are:
– fX(a1, b1) = (a1, b1)
– fZ(a1, b1) = (a1, b1)
– fH(a1, b1) = (b1, a1)
– fP(a1, b1) = (a1, a1 ⊕ b1)
– fCNOT(a1, b1, a2, b2) = (a1 ⊕ a2, b1, a2, b1 ⊕ b2)
– fT(a, b) = (α1, α2, α3, α4)
Let CX, CZ, CH, CP, CCNOT and CT denote the classical circuits (called sub-
circuits) that compute fX, fZ, fHfP, fCNOT and fT respectively. Clearly, these
subcircuits are of constant size. Recall that all subcircuits for Cliffords map k-
bit strings to k-bit strings (k ∈ {0, 1}), but CT expands its 2-bit input into
a 4ℓ-bit strings (where ℓ = max{
∣∣1+i
2
∣∣ , ∣∣ 1−i2 ∣∣}22. Let C be a circuit that com-
putes FCq . Then C can be expressed in terms of these gadgets. To construct C,
we go gate-by-gate in Cq and employ the corresponding subcircuit. If Cq is a
22 The notation |a + bi| denotes the number of bits to represent the complex number
a+ bi.
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Clifford circuit, then C only consists of Clifford subcircuit (as mentioned earlier
they map k bits to k bits k ∈ {2, 4} there are O(|Cq |) gadgets in the circuit
C). Otherwise if Cq has k T-gates, then each CT subcircuit will map a 2-bit
string to a 4ℓ-bit string, potentially increasing the size of C to O((4ℓ)
k
), but
since k ∈ O(log(|Cq|), we have O((4ℓ)k) ∈ O(|Cq |). Therefore, there exists a
polynomial p(·) such that |C| ≤ p(n). ⊓⊔
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A Size of Coefficients in Update Functions
Here, we prove a Lemma that is used in Section 5.1.
Lemma 9. Let Cq be an n-qubit quantum circuit with O(log |Cq|) number of
gates and FCq be the corresponding update function
FCq : {0, 1}2n −→ (C× {0, 1}2n)min(k,n),
(a1, b1, . . . , an, bn) 7→ ((β1, s1), . . . , (β4k , s4k)) .
then there exists a polynomial p(·) such βi ∈ O(p(|Cq |)) for all i ∈ [4k].
Proof. The following map is an isomorphism between C and R2
f : C← R2, (a+ bi) 7→ (a, b) (31)
Note that there is a one-to-one map between FCq and the corresponding uni-
tary UFCq =
∑4k
i=1 βiX
bi1Zai1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ XbinZain , k ≤ n. Note that any Clifford
gate can only affect the correction bits in unitaries of type UFCq , but will have no
effect on the coefficients βi. So the coefficients can be affected by T gates. There-
fore, to estimate the size of the coefficients we can ignore other gates. Each βi
is constructed by adding and multiplying numbers from the set
{
0, 1, 1+i2 ,
1−i
2
}
.
We note the following relationships between 1+i2 ,
1−i
2(
1 + i
2
)
±
(
1− i
2
)
= ±1.
If m = 2ℓ+ 1 and ℓ ∈ N, then (
1± i
2
)m
=
(a
2
)ℓ
, a ∈ {±1,±i}.
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Else if m = 2ℓ and ℓ ∈ N ∪ {0}, then(
1± i
2
)m
=
(a
2
)ℓ(1± i
2
)
, a ∈ {±1,±i}
Therefore, we can represent
(
1±i
2
)m
inO(m) bits and
(
1+i
2
)m ( 1−i
2
)m
inO(m)
bits. Of course 1m = 1 and adding 1 to itself is m. For each application of T, a
coefficient will multiply and add at most polynomial time in the circuit size and
there are O(log(|Cq|)) such gates, therefore there exists a polynomial p(·) such
that |βi| ∈ O(p(|Cq |)), for every i ∈ [4k]. ⊓⊔
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